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A (Não Tão Rápida) Força de Projeção Rápida: 
Barreiras Burocráticas e Políticas à Implementa-
ção de uma Mudança Estratégica
No início de sua presidência, o Presidente Carter 
aprovou a Diretiva Presidencial 18 (PD-18), que 
previa a criação de uma Força de Projeção Rápida 
(FPR) com o objetivo de responder rapidamente a 
crises e ameaças fora da área, nomeadamente no 
Oriente Médio. Porém, a diretiva foi insuficiente 
para catalisar a implementação da FPR. O artigo 
analisa os principais entraves à implementação da 
FPR, destacando as barreiras burocráticas e políti-
cas. Os estudos existentes sobre o desenvolvimento 
da FPR têm focado essencialmente a resistência da 
burocracia na implementação da FPR. Apesar de 
reconhecer estas limitações, o valor do atual ensaio 
é o seu enfoque nas resistências políticas ao FPR, 
especialmente as resultantes do debate interinstitu-
cional sobre a natureza da détente. Argumenta-se 
através do recurso a uma variedade de fontes pri-
márias, que a principal barreira à criação e imple-
mentação da FPR foi a luta política no seio da 
Administração Carter, nomeadamente entre o Con-
selho de Segurança Nacional e o Departamento de 
Estado, para definir a estratégia global dos Estados 
Unidos. 
Abstract
Early in his Presidency, President Carter approved 
PD-18 which foresaw the creation of a Rapid Deploy-
ment Force (RDF) with the purpose of responding 
quickly to out-of-area crises and threats, particularly in 
the Middle East. The directive however was insufficient 
to catalyze the RDF’s implementation. The paper ana-
lyzes the main impediments to the implementation of the 
RDF, highlighting the bureaucratic and political barri-
ers. The existing studies on the development of the RDF 
have essentially highlighted the bureaucratic resistance 
to its implementation. While acknowledging these con-
straints, the value of the current paper is its focus on the 
political barriers to the RDF, particularly those resulting 
from the interagency debate regarding the nature of 
détente. Based an assortment of primary sources the 
paper argues that the main barrier to the creation and 
implementation of the RDF was the political struggle to 
define United States strategy within the Administra-
tion, particularly between the NSC and the State 
Department.
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Introduction
President Carter came to office with the intent of continuing a policy of détente. In 
particular he sought to adjust US military commitments to the available resources 
and downplay US-Soviet antagonisms. In early 1977, President Carter ordered the 
National Security Council (NSC) to proceed with a major reassessment of US-Soviet 
competition across the globe. The result of this re-evaluation was Policy Review 
Memorandum 10 (PRM-10), which analyzed the balance between the US and the 
USSR in a wide range of functional issues, namely in the military, economic, politi-
cal, and intelligence fields. The review also identified the major regions subject to 
US-Soviet competition. The recommendations of this review gave rise to Presiden-
tial Directive 18 (PD-18) in August 1977. According to PD-18, the US military should 
develop the capabilities to rapidly project force in crisis situations, particularly into 
the Persian Gulf, and specifically by creating a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).
The response to PD-18 is particularly revealing of the resistance to policy change. 
Despite some of the Administration’s efforts, particularly in the NSC, several barri-
ers contributed to hindering the implementation of the RDF. First of all, additional 
financial resources were not allocated to this undertaking and existing resources 
were already committed to other missions and operational requirements. In par-
ticular, the continued importance of Europe in American strategic considerations 
contributed to stalling progress. Turf wars also emerged among the armed services 
hindering organizational details and preparations. However, political struggles to 
define US strategy were equally significant in obstructing the prompt implementa-
tion of the RDF. While the NSC, led by the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs (APNSA), actively promoted a more assertive military policy in the 
Middle East, the State Department believed the creation of the RDF to be counter-
productive to improved cooperation with the Soviets and prejudicial to détente.
The following sections use recently unclassified primary documental sources from 
the Carter Administration to assess the breakdown of the implementation of the 
RDF. The article begins, however, with a brief conceptualization of the main foreign 
policy decision-making models. The subsequent section provides an overview of 
the political discussion which catalyzed PD-18 and the demand for a rapid reaction 
force. The following two sections assess the main bureaucratic and political barriers 
to the creation and implementation of the RDF. Particular emphasis is placed on 
Brzezinski’s and the NSC staffs’ continuous endeavors to promote the RDF and the 
political obstacles they encountered within the Administration’s upper echelons. 
Finally, bearing in mind the current Administration’s goal of rebalancing US policy 
toward the Asia-Pacific region, some caveats and recommendations are presented 
which may be insightful for decision-makers in managing the change process.
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Models of Foreign Policy Decision-Making
Before we can proceed in explaining the barriers to the development and the imple-
mentation of the RDF, some conceptual issues require clarification. Allison and 
Zelikow (1999) have provided the seminal text on foreign policy decision-making. 
As an alternative to the traditional Rational Actor Model (RAM), the authors put 
forward two additional decision-making models which they argue explain the 
complex and sometimes irrational behavior of states more cogently – i.e., the organ-
izational behavior model (Model II) and the governmental politics model (Model 
III). Since its original publication in the 1970s, the models provided in Essence of 
Decision became a standard in foreign policy analysis (Bernstein, 2000).
However, despite their analytical value, Allison and Zelikow’s models reveal some 
discrepancies which should be acknowledged. In particular, several researchers 
have pointed out that it is difficult to separate between the organizational behavior 
model and the governmental politics model (Bendor and Hammond, 1992; Bern-
stein, 2000; Krasner, 1972; Wagner, 1974). In fact, different authors have attributed 
different operational characteristics to Allison and Zelikow’s alternative decision-
making models. For instance, while evaluating these models, Wagner (1974) associ-
ates Model III with bureaucratic politics. While not properly clarifying what he 
understands by bureaucratic politics, Wagner (1974: 448) does recognize the diffi-
culty in distinguishing between the two models by acknowledging that “it is not 
entirely clear whether Model III is independent of Model II or an extension of it”. In 
contrast, Steinbruner (2002) associates bureaucratic politics with Model II. Stein-
bruner parallels Allison’s organizational behavior model to the cybernetic decision-
making model. The cybernetic paradigm relies significantly on standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) in the sense that a decision-maker has “a repertory of operations 
which he performs in sequence while monitoring a few feedback variables” (Stein-
bruner, 2002: 55).
One of the main reasons for this conceptual confusion is the tendency in political 
science, particularly in foreign policy analysis, to clump a plethora of concepts such 
as “cabinet politics”, “court politics”, “politics of the inner circle”, and “bureau-
cratic politics”, all under the umbrella term “governmental politics” (Stern and Ver-
beek, 1998). This has led to a generalized misunderstanding as to what researchers 
actually mean when applying these terms. In order to avoid such ambiguity in 
analyzing the development and implementation of the RDF, the current paper dif-
ferentiates between bureaucratic politics and governmental politics.
Accordingly, when analyzing the bureaucratic resistance to the RDF, we are refer-
ring to the mid- or lower-level bureaucratic organizations within the government 
apparatus. The key features underlying organizational behavior are SOPs – i.e., 
established rules and routines which allow each particular organization to perform 
their mission appropriately (Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Kaufman, 2001). These rou-
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tines develop a set of unconscious, self-sustaining, and recurring practices which 
guide the actions of a particular organization. Thus, habitual routines operate auto-
matically and perpetuate behavior. Moreover, routines allow individuals in an 
organization to dispense with much of the ado involved in achieving a minimum 
common definition of the situation, in working out some kind of shared plan to 
deal with a situation, and in coordinating its execution:
“Because similar stimuli are automatically treated the same way when a habit-
ual routine is in effect, a group can move quickly beyond stimulus coding 
activities. Because habitual behavior follows automatically from recognition of 
the invoking stimuli, a group need not spend time creating and choosing the 
behavioral strategy that will guide the work. And because habitual routines 
are well practiced, the time and energy needed to coordinate among members 
in executing behaviors is kept low” (Gersick and Hackman, 1990: 71).
While each individual bureaucratic organization may have its own objectives and 
goals, the policy options they provide are essentially focused on the most “satisfic-
ing” outcome ensuing from the existing response repertories (Sterinbruner, 2002). 
From this perspective, bureaucratic organizations are inherently resistant to change. 
SOPs undermine innovation and change by promoting inertia within the organiza-
tion. Due to the repetitive nature of the routines, individuals are not stimulated to 
ponder or pursue alternative courses of action. The low-level of confrontation 
within the organization tends to guarantee a level of social conformity which is 
contrary to innovative thinking. Moreover, as time goes by and individuals become 
comfortable within their social context, the motivation and impulse for change in 
the organization weakens. In this sense, SOPs function as “stabilizers” which 
reduce the vulnerability implicit in change (Goldmann, 1983).
The bureaucratic model therefore contrasts significantly with the current paper’s 
conceptualization of the governmental politics model. Just as in Allison and Zel-
likow’s (1999) conceptualization, governmental politics emphasizes the interac-
tions between top-level politically appointed officials during the decision-making 
process. However, the governmental politics model employed in the current paper 
differs from Allison and Zellikow’s Model III in several aspects. To begin with, this 
perspective is distinct since it acknowledges George’s (1980: 115) claim that bureau-
cratic politics is essentially a phenomenon associated with the “middle echelons” of 
power, whereas “cabinet politics at the highest level may take place relatively inde-
pendently of bureaucratic politics”. In this sense, the dynamics of governmental 
politics resembles much more those generally associated with small group politics 
– i.e., group interaction, group problem-solving, and social sharing (Echterhoff et 
al., 2009; Holsti, 2006; Stern and Sundelius, 2011).
Moreover, policy outcomes do not inevitably result from the negotiation of com-
peting preferences as Allison and Zellikow (1999) propose. Several authors have 
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attested that an Administrations’ highest officials do not necessarily have to have 
conflicting objectives (Bendor and Hammond, 1992; Krasner, 1972). In fact, Kras-
ner (1972: 166; see also Bernstein, 2000) has highlighted an elementary fact regard-
ing the nature of the Presidential advisory group: “The President chooses most of 
the important players and sets the rules”. Accordingly, presidential advisors, 
even the heads of the large bureaucratic organizations, share a set of core beliefs 
and values, as well as a sense of personal loyalty to the President. This observa-
tion does not deny conflicting views within a decision-making body. Rather, as 
George suggests, it emphasizes other dynamics involved in catalyzing policy 
change:
“…in constituting small decision making groups executives often prefer indi-
viduals who operate with a broader, less parochial view of the values at stake. 
The advantage of forming the group in this way is that such advisors are less 
likely to engage in bargaining in order to protect the narrow bureaucratic 
interests of subunits of the organization. When decision-making is in the 
hands of a small group, it is probably easier for individual members to con-
vince each other or to change their own minds than it is in larger, more formal 
groups in which each high official is identified as representing his own depart-
ment or agency.” (George, 1980: 86)
Above all, the governmental politics model is focused on the political contest within 
the upper echelons of the foreign policy decision-making body to frame and define 
what is important in each different political context (Garrison, 2001). As ‘t Hart 
(2011: 317) has made patently clear, the “crucial task for policymakers is to arrive at 
sound and workable definitions of what the problems are, what can realistically be 
expected of government to diminish or perhaps completely solve them, what spe-
cific options (actions, measures, programs) are available, and which (combinations 
of) options stand the best chance of achieving the desired ends”. From this perspec-
tive, the intense political debate to frame the issues and define the policies sur-
rounding PD-18 and the overall US-Soviet relationship was the main barrier to the 
effective implementation of the RDF.
Carter and the Reassessment of US Strategy
Acknowledging the relative decline of US power, Jimmy Carter came to the White 
House seeking to maintain a policy of détente whilst devaluing the traditional East-
West focus on international relations. According to Skidmore (1996: 31), the Carter 
Administration sought to implement a strategy of adjustment in which the US 
could rebalance its foreign policy objectives and commitments, namely by “reduc-
ing US commitments in peripheral areas, sharing burdens more evenly with friends 
and allies and seeking accommodation with adversaries or rivals where this proved 
consistent with US interests”. In order for this strategy to succeed, the Administra-
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tion would have to introduce selective cutbacks in US overseas commitments, 
while simultaneously enhancing its diplomatic activities.
On 18 February 1977, Carter signed PRM-10 with the purpose of initiating a com-
prehensive assessment of the overall American national strategy and US capabili-
ties. The review was to consist of two distinct studies. The first was a Military Force 
Posture Review that would delineate a broad assortment of alternative military 
strategies and develop the alternative military force postures and programs that 
best sustained each of the military strategies. The second study was a Comprehen-
sive Net Assessment (CNA) that would consist of a review and comparison of the 
overarching developments in capabilities – i.e., political, diplomatic, economic, 
technological, and military – between the US, its allies, and its adversaries, particu-
larly the USSR.
In June 1977 the Secretary of Defense submitted the final report of the Military 
Force Posture Review (PRM-10 Annex). The review was designed to solicit Presi-
dential policy guidance on issues dealing with US military strategy. The study was 
founded on an assortment of deep-seated assumptions. To begin with, it was 
believed that the Soviets would continue to pose the main threat to US interests and 
American security at home and abroad. The second major postulate was that Euro-
pean security would continue to be vital to the US and America would maintain its 
commitment to actively defend NATO against aggression by the Warsaw Pact. 
Equally, aggression against Japan was also deemed a threat to US vital interests. A 
further assumption was that any conciliation between the Soviets and Chinese 
would not be sufficient to warrant a significant decline in the military forces facing 
each other. Therefore, continued Sino-Soviet hostility implied that the US would 
not need to secure specific conventional forces in order to counter a potential Chi-
nese military threat. Finally, the study assumed that, due to the interdependent 
international environment, the US would continue to have major interests world-
wide.
The Military Force Posture Review also assessed the capabilities of the American 
force structure (PRM-10, Annex). Consequently, it concluded that if war with the 
Soviets erupted at that time there was only a remote chance that NATO could stop 
a Warsaw Pact attack to Central Europe. While defeat of NATO forces in Central 
Europe and penetration towards the French border and North Sea Coast was 
deemed unlikely, the study considered it implausible that NATO forces could 
quickly recover the lost territory. It was also assumed that an Allied victory in a US-
Soviet confrontation outside Europe was uncertain. Moreover, a nuclear confronta-
tion between the US and the Soviets would result in a high degree of devastation to 
both parties and would not bring victory to either.
Nevertheless, the PRM-10 study did divulge several interesting assumptions 
about US-Soviet competition and US military capabilities, particularly regarding 
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the Middle East. To begin with, it emphasized the strategic importance of the region 
for the US and its Allies. The need to safeguard access to the regions’ natural 
resources created the potential need for American intervention. Moreover, while 
competition with the Soviets was considered the highest threat and priority for 
developing US strategy, the study foresaw the importance of local conflicts, namely 
in the Third World. Continued international crises and local wars warranting US 
involvement were judged very likely over the coming decade. US action could vary 
from crisis management or peacekeeping activities to direct military intervention. 
The response varied according to each particular circumstance, allowing for a large 
measure of flexibility in choosing the appropriate course of action. Nevertheless, 
the study upheld that the “significance of interests in some regions, such as the 
Middle East, may justify a degree of military involvement under any circum-
stances” (PRM-10, Annex: 24).
The main problem with this contingency was US force projection into the region. To 
meet operational demands, the study indicated that decision-makers could choose 
between two main options: procure additional resources or draw down from exist-
ing capabilities. In the case the US did not want to draw down on existing forces, 
the study recommended securing additional land combat forces and tactical air 
forces. Supplementary naval forces and strategic mobility forces, along with air-
borne and amphibious forces, depended on the level of intervention selected in 
each particular moment. If, however, the option was to draw down, a certain num-
ber of caveats were presented, namely concerning the mix of forces, deployments, 
and operational requirements. In particular, PRM-10 argued that the chronological 
relationship between local and global conflicts would highly influence the opera-
tional availability and effectiveness of the forces.
Consequently, PRM-10 reflected the general belief, principally within the Adminis-
tration, that the US lacked the military capability necessary to deal with the multi-
ple potential security threats in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East. 
However, the interagency debate over PRM-10 revealed different perspectives 
within the Administration on how to deal with the multiple challenges presented 
to American security. The Policy Review Committee (PRC) discussed PRM-10 in 
early July 1977. At the 08 July PRC meeting a broad agreement emerged that “forces 
procured for this purpose should be added to those required for a NATO/Warsaw 
Pact war” (PRC, 08/07/1977: 2). The group considered the Middle East, the Persian 
Gulf, and Korea to be the most critical areas. Moreover, forces procured for these 
theaters could be used elsewhere if necessary. The top foreign policy decision-mak-
ers all shared the conviction that it was necessary for the US to be able to secure its 
national interests in these regions. In order to achieve this objective, the APNSA 
proposed the creation of a highly responsive global strike force.
As a result of this interagency debate, President Carter signed PD-18 on 24 August, 
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1977. PD-18 codified the Carter Administration’s US National Strategy. The direc-
tive focused essentially on the US-USSR relationship and acknowledged that the 
US continued to have several critical advantages over the Soviets. As a result, it 
called for the US to harness its economic, technological, and political assets in order 
to counterbalance Soviet military power and influence in key regions, particularly 
Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.
As Njølstad (2004) has accurately recognized, PD-18 stressed two major and 
demanding priorities for US global strategy. The first was the reassertion of the US 
commitment to a forward defense strategy for NATO, emphasizing the continued 
priority of European defense and security. The second was the need to create the 
necessary conditions for the US to be able to act in urgent situations outside Europe, 
particularly in the Middle East. For that reason, PD-18 called for the creation of the 
RDF with the purpose of responding quickly to out-of-area crises and threats:
“…the United States will maintain a deployment force of light divi-
sions with strategic mobility independent of overseas bases and logistical 
support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited 
land combat forces. These forces will be designed for use against both local 
forces and forces projected by the USSR based on analyses of requirements in 
the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea, taking into account the contribu-
tion of our friends and allies in these regions.” (PD-18: 4)
However, the creation and implementation of the RDF promptly became mired 
within the bureaucratic apparatus and the political struggle to define the US-Soviet 
relationship. Since the different actors and agencies were still very much focused on 
other issues and regions, they were reluctant to press on with the RDF’s implemen-
tation.
Bureaucratic Resistance to the Implementation of the RDF
Initially, the provisions of PD-18 were largely ignored by the multiple governmen-
tal bureaucracies. The different agencies in the State Department and the Depart-
ment of Defense, as well as the intelligence community resisted the idea of aug-
menting the force projection capabilities foreseen in the directive. According to 
former NSC staffer William Odom (2006), each agency had its particular reasons for 
resisting the stipulations of PD-18. For the State Department, an increased US mili-
tary presence was considered counterproductive since it might provoke a reaction 
from radical Arab groups. In addition, a more assertive military posture might also 
impair relations with the Soviets, particularly in the area of arms control agree-
ments. For the Defense Department, budget restrictions hindered any additional 
consideration of reallocating available resources. With a budgetary reduction of 
38% since 1968 (Odom, 2006), the Department of Defense was unwilling to divert 
resources from what it considered its top priority – i.e., Europe. Moreover, the Pen-
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tagon was not particularly inclined to take on missions involving unconventional 
warfare as would be the case in the Middle East (Kupchan, 1987). The intelligence 
community, for its part, was more concerned with other issues, such as preserving 
strategic facilities in Iran, and paid little attention to the Administration’s new strat-
egy. On the whole, the different agencies were immersed in their routines and “once 
PD-18 was signed, the Pentagon essentially ignored the directive to set up an RDF, 
and the State Department showed no interest in making it acceptable to US friends 
in the region” (Odom, 2006: 59).
The military bureaucracy also created roadblocks to the operationalization of the 
RDF’s Gulf contingency planning. Turf wars between the military services hin-
dered the planning process (Bliddal, 2011). The Navy and the Marine Corps sup-
ported a strategy based on US naval superiority. Wary of the need to assume mere 
sealift services for ground forces, the Navy proposed the introduction of several 
carrier task forces in the Gulf region or the implementation of a strategy of horizon-
tal escalation in which the US Navy would engage the Soviet navy in peripheral 
areas. The Marines also deemphasized the need for large-scale ground forces. Being 
a force dedicated to amphibious assault, the Marines sided with the Navy by rec-
ommending a limited ground strategy in the littoral areas of the Gulf. The Army, for 
its part, favored a strategy that relied on heavily armored combat units placed deep 
within the region. In addition, the Army also stressed the need to employ light air-
borne units. Consequently, the Air Force sided with the Army since it would be 
responsible for transporting the forces into the region. However, the Air Force also 
proposed a strategy that would make use of deep air strikes and air support of 
ground forces, reinforcing a strategy focused on the region’s interior.
In addition, the bureaucratic discussion over the military command structure 
responsible for the RDF also hampered its prompt and efficient operationalization. 
The existing regional command structures – i.e., European Command (EUCOM) 
and Pacific Command (PACOM) – divided the map of the Middle East. While 
EUCOM was responsible for military operations in the Eastern Mediterranean 
states, including Iran and the Persian Gulf, PACOM was in charge of Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the coordination of overseas 
deployment in areas outside the existing commands was assigned to Readiness 
Command (REDCOM). Since each command’s principal interests were in regions 
other than the Middle East, command of the RDF was complicated. The individual 
commands competed for control over the force. More precisely, PACOM sought to 
expand its territorial responsibility westward to include the Persian Gulf region, 
while EUCOM wanted its area of responsibility to be expanded eastward to include 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the access routes to the Persian Gulf in the Indian 
Ocean. REDCOM, for its part, claimed that since it was designed to manage rapid 
deployment operations, the mission in the Gulf should be its responsibility. The 
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competition for control over the RDF hindered progress in its implementation and 
subsequent policy decisions towards the Middle East. As Kupchan (1987: 90) has 
observed, assigning control to “an existing command would not have created suf-
ficient bureaucratic momentum to implement the administration’s new policy”. 
However, while bureaucratic dynamics may help elucidate some of the slippage 
between the Executive’s decision and the effective implementation of the RDF, they 
do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the long delay in its materialization 
and operationalization. Rather, the different strategic outlooks among the Presi-
dent’s closest advisers were the most serious impediments to the swift implementa-
tion of the RDF. While the Middle East was acknowledged by the principals as a 
vital strategic region there was considerable dispute within the Administration 
regarding overall policy orientation. According to Brzezinski (1983), two main 
groups with divergent perspectives emerged during the discussions. One group, 
composed of Secretary of State Vance and Director of the Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency Paul Warnke, favored a policy that limited US strategic forces to 
an assured destruction capability, while concurrently reducing American forces in 
Europe and Korea. This group sought to address the challenges pertaining to the 
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region through arms control initiatives negotiated with 
the Soviets – e.g., upcoming Indian Ocean demilitarization talks. The other group, 
which included Brzezinski and eventually Secretary of Defense Brown, empha-
sized the growing momentum of the Soviet military and the vulnerability of the 
Persian Gulf region. They argued that the increased capability of the Soviets to 
project power into the Third World threatened US interests in these regions and 
required a more robust response. As a result, as the following section illustrates, the 
political contest to define policy in the upper echelons of the Administration ulti-
mately hindered the quick and efficient implementation of the RDF.
Political Barriers to the Implementation of the RDF
The APNSA was particularly active in promoting the implementation of the RDF 
amongst the President and the Administration. Above all, the capacity to project 
American power abroad was perfectly adjusted to Brzezinski’s view of détente. 
While adhering to a cooperative stance vis-à-vis the Soviets, Brzezinski (1983) con-
tinually emphasized the need for greater reciprocity from the USSR. More precisely, 
he continuously underlined the need for the US to make it “unmistakably clear to 
the Soviet Union that détente requires responsible behavior from them on funda-
mental issues of global order”, particularly in the Third World (reproduced in 
Brzezinski, 1983: 150).
Accordingly, Brzezinski used his cabinet status and his influence to push the imple-
mentation of the RDF since the beginning of the Presidency. For instance, in Janu-
ary 1978, when discussing US policy regarding the Ogaden War, Brzezinski was 
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adamant in promoting a more assertive US posture in order to dissuade the Soviets 
and its proxies from intervening in the conflict. As a result, in the Special Coordi-
nating Committee (SCC) meeting chaired by him on 26 January 1978, the principals 
decided, in a clear reference to the provisions of PD-18, to “accelerate study of our 
own capabilities and those of other governments to intervene in the situation in 
ways that could complicate or make more costly the Soviet/Cuba intervention” 
(SCC, 27/01/1978: 2). However, Brzezinski was countered by the other foreign 
policy decision-makers. In particular, Vance (1983) rejected any idea that their 
actions in Africa were part of any Soviet grand design. On the contrary, Vance 
viewed Soviet behavior simply as the exploitation of emerging opportunities.
The Iranian Revolution offered Brzezinski a new opportunity to press the need for 
the RDF. In a late December Weekly Report, Brzezinski warned Carter of the dire 
situation in the region: “The disintegration of Iran, with Iran repeating the experi-
ence of Afghanistan, would be the most massive American defeat since the begin-
ning of the Cold War, overshadowing in its real consequences the setback in Viet-
nam” (Brzezinski to Carter, 28/12/1978: 4). Among other initiatives, the APNSA 
recommended that US should implement a military posture which could adequately 
balance the Soviets, namely by carrying out the provisions foreseen in PD-18.
After the fall of the Shah, Brzezinski submitted a memo to the President titled 
“Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East” assessing the situation in 
the region and recommending policy options that might compensate for recent set-
backs. Brzezinski proposed the development of a broad consultative security 
framework for the Middle East (Brzezinski to Carter, 03/03/1979: 2). The demands 
of such an undertaking would require US leadership and a significant increase in 
American economic and military assistance to the region, as well as an increase in 
the US military presence in the Middle East.
Brzezinski reinforced his position by subsequently submitting the Comprehensive 
Net Assessment-1978 (CNA-78). The study concluded that in the previous two 
years the Soviets had gained a foothold in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen, 
while losing Somalia. However, the loss of US influence in Iran was considered to 
have “major implications for the regional balance of power, domestic stability in 
neighboring states, the world oil supply, and US intelligence and security interests” 
(CNA-78, 30/03/1979: 7). In the view of the NSC, the strategy set out in PD-18 was 
substantially validated. However, current developments required some changes in 
the framework of the directive. The study presented several proposals for enhanc-
ing America’s position in the arena of global competition. In particular, rapid and 
coordinated action was necessary to develop the strategic mobility and quick reac-
tion forces envisioned in PD-18.
Secretary Vance was particularly critical of the content of CNA-78 arguing that the 
US did not require a standing military force projection capability for the Middle 
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East (Odom, 2006). In fact, in early-May, 1979, the State Department denounced 
CNA-78 for its pessimistic outlook and raised methodological issues concerning 
the studies central assumptions (Tarnoff to Brzezinski, 01/05/1979). In contrast, 
Secretary Brown and the Department of Defense responded positively to the study 
since it was attuned to the mounting security concerns within the Pentagon (Brzez-
inski to Brown, 01/05/1979).
As the situation in Iran began displaying some tenuous forms of normality, the 
discussions within the Administration as to how to secure and improve the overall 
US position in the Middle East moved on to other areas. More precisely, in a Vance-
Brown-Brzezinski luncheon on 03 August1979, it was decided that the Department 
of Defense would develop a new report on the RDF (Brzezinski to Carter, 
03/08/1979). The study presented by the Pentagon highlighted the need for the US 
to increase its power projection in the Gulf region (Bliddal, 2011). As a result, Secre-
tary Brown ordered the reluctant Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate a joint-service level 
planning of the RDF (Odom, 2006). However, as the bureaucratic turf wars contin-
ued among the armed services, in the summer of 1979, Brown acknowledged in a 
memo assessing the progress made on the RDF, “most of our work is before us” 
(quoted in Bliddal, 2011: 31). 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan renewed the discussion on the need for imple-
menting the RDF. The day following the invasion, in a memo submitted to the Pres-
ident, Brzezinski restated his thesis that Soviet success in Afghanistan would fulfill 
the traditional Russian aspiration of gaining direct access to the Indian Ocean. The 
subject was now particularly pertinent since the “Iranian crisis has led to the col-
lapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet pres-
ence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs” (Brzezinski to Carter, 
26/12/1979: 1). 
The Afghan crisis emphasized the effective limitation still affecting the implemen-
tation of the RDF. The discussion of the available policy options was seriously con-
strained since the US had very little effective capability to make any compelling 
demonstration of force in the region. This was evident in the 27 December memo 
from the NSC staff which emphasized the serious deployment problems still facing 
the RDF (Aaron to Brzezinski, 27/12/1979). Actually, the Administration had been 
seeking to secure basing, over flight, and transit access rights in Djibouti, Kenya, 
Oman, and Somalia for some time (Ermarth and Welch to Brzezinski, 16/01/1980). 
However, formal access was not yet guaranteed at this time, hindering American 
power projection in the region.
Nevertheless, the ensuing interagency debate highlighted the continued diver-
gence among the principals on Soviet objectives. Two main theories existed to 
explain Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The first, argued by Vance, was that 
Soviet intervention was essentially local and limited and directly associated to per-
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ceived threats to its national security. The second theory, championed by Brzezin-
ski, had a more global perspective and claimed that the Soviets had calculated that, 
due to the quickly deteriorating US-USSR relations, they had nothing to lose by 
decisively eliminating the Afghan threat and improving their strategic position in 
the region. In accordance with this view, the consolidation of the Soviet position in 
Afghanistan would allow them to better exploit the situation in Iran and pressure 
Pakistan and India as a response to increased US involvement in the Indian Ocean 
and Middle East (Vance, 1983).
Despite the disagreements on Soviet intentions, the majority of the principals 
agreed to the overall strategy of assuming a more assertive role towards the Sovi-
ets, particularly in challenging its expansion into the Middle East. This shared out-
look was evident in the 14 January SCC meeting on the US Strategy for South West 
Asia and Persian Gulf (SCC, 14/01/1980). All of the members accepted that the US 
must bolster Pakistan’s capacity to resist further Soviet encroachment in the region. 
Brzezinski argued that if a Moscow/Kabul/New Delhi Axis threatened Pakistan, 
the US would respond by developing “a US/PRC/Pakistan/ and eventually Iran 
axis as a counter” (SCC, 14/01/1980: 2). This analysis did not raise any dissenting 
views since there was an interagency consensus that a new regional security frame-
work was essential. Some differences did exist regarding the need to safeguard US 
access to bases in Pakistan. Therefore, it was determined that the US would not 
currently press this issue as a way of not overloading relations with India. Never-
theless, basing access in other countries, such as Oman and Somalia, was agreed to.
In regards to US military capacities in the region, General Jones highlighted that the 
Soviet military deployment in Afghanistan would change the regional military bal-
ance by facilitating penetration into the Persian Gulf region. According to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the short-term measures for the meeting the Soviet challenges were 
to project tactical air power into Egypt and Jordan, request that Saudi Arabia assist 
in supporting US fighter formations, and preposition heavy equipment and sup-
plies in the region (SCC, 14/01/1980). By adopting these proposals, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff argued that the US could significantly reduce the time for deployment of 
heavy ground forces and for the first time provide sealift supply capabilities. These 
considerations were consistent with the report Odom had submitted to Brzezinski 
the previous week and which emphasized the problems of securing the necessary 
funding and enthusiasm for effectively implementing the RDF and the need for the 
White House to enforce the complete implementation of PD-18 (Odom to Brzezin-
ski, 07/01/1980: 1).
The announcement of the Carter Doctrine on 23 January 1980 attributed a renewed 
urgency to effectively implementing the RDF. The new commitment to defend the 
Persian Gulf from potential Soviet aggression led the Department of Defense to 
develop a compromise solution that consisted in establishing as of May 1980 a 
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Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) under the command of REDCOM 
(Odom, 2006). The RDJTF was instructed to plan, train, and be ready to deploy and 
employ RDF forces in case of international contingencies (Bliddal, 2011).
Despite the Pentagon’s best intentions, the effective establishment of the RDF con-
tinued marred by interagency squabbling. In fact, in mid-May 1980, Brzezinski 
relayed his exasperation in his NSC Weekly Report by claiming that “Getting 
results is like pulling teeth” (Brzezinski to Carter, 16/05/1980).
Some progress was made nonetheless. By mid-1980, several concrete initiatives had 
been carried out, namely (Brzezinski, 1983): US force capabilities were improved 
due to the acquisition of access to regional facilities; increased Navy and Marine 
presence in the Middle East region; joint contingency planning had begun with 
some key regional allies and joint exercises were scheduled; regional allies were 
supported in improving their defense capabilities and procedures for the sale of 
military equipment were streamlined; European NATO allies were encouraged to 
share greater responsibility for their security; and the development of a very small 
and rapid intervention force for aiding friendly regimes under subversive attack 
was approved.
Nevertheless, while the regional security framework and the development of the 
RDF were progressing due to the NSC’s, particularly Brzezinski’s, initiative, the 
final months of the Carter Presidency once again gave way to a heated interagency 
debate on US strategy for the Middle East. The 24 November SCC meeting is illus-
trative of the divergent views still persisting within the Administration (SCC, 
24/11/1980). At the heart of the discussion was the Department of Defense’s paper 
on “Basic Strategy Issues”. According to Brown, in the upcoming years, the strate-
gic challenges facing the US implied the need to acquire capability for America to 
fight one full-scale war or two “half wars” (Brzezinski, 1983: 469). These scenarios 
would require the US, among other measures, to increase its military capabilities in 
the Middle East. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, also com-
mented on the need for the US to be able to secure its vital interests without being 
dependent on its regional allies. Brzezinski and Brown countered that in Europe 
and Japan the US would require the ally’s help to defend them. However, both 
principals agreed that in the Persian Gulf region only the US could defend it and it 
should be prepared to do so. The recently appointed Secretary of State Edmund 
Muskie was particularly critical of the Department of Defense assessment and 
demanded a revision of the underlying strategic issues (SCC, 24/11/1980).
However, even more revealing of the barriers ensuing from the internal political 
dispute was the failure to create a unified command for the RDF. The creation of the 
US Central Command (CENTCOM) would only be achieved during the Reagan 
Presidency (Odom, 2006). Since then, CENTCOM has become one of the pillars of 
US global security. It has been responsible for planning and carrying out many of 
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America’s recent large-scale military operations in the Greater Middle East region, 
namely in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Conclusion
President Carter arrived in Washington intent on reviewing and changing many of 
the existing policies. In the early months of the Presidency, the Administration dis-
cussed the American national strategy and US capabilities. During this debate the 
strategic importance of the Middle East was highlighted, as were the limitations 
that the US faced in securing its interests in the region. Accordingly, President 
Carter approved PD-18 which foresaw the creation of the RDF with the purpose of 
responding quickly to out-of-area crises and threats.
The directive however was insufficient to catalyze the RDF’s implementation. 
Besides bureaucratic resistance in the armed services, the heads of the Departments 
of Defense and State were generally unresponsive. In particular, Secretary Vance 
viewed the RDF as detrimental to détente. The APNSA and his NSC staff tried 
arduously to convince the Administrations’ key decision-makers to implement the 
RDF. Brzezinski took advantage of his central role in the decision-making process 
to push the issue every chance he could. Nevertheless, despite the NSC’s initiative, 
implementation of the RDF eluded the Carter Administration. The effective opera-
tionalization of the RDF would only be realized with the Reagan Administration.
Bureaucratic inertia has long been identified as a barrier to change. It has conven-
tionally been identified as the main barrier to the implementation of the RDF (Blid-
dal, 2011; Kupchan, 1987). However, using a governmental politics model is particu-
larly useful in understanding the record of the RDF. As Allison and Zelikow (1999: 
255) argue, policy “outcomes are formed, and deformed, by the interaction of com-
peting preferences”. It was the struggle within the upper echelons of the Carter 
Administration, predominantly between the main political actors in the State 
Department and the NSC, to define the policy of détente that ultimately hindered 
the effective implementation of the RDF. Secretary of State Vance was particularly 
effective in thwarting the implementation of the RDF by arguing that it would dam-
age continued US-Soviet cooperation. It was the APNSA’s continuous initiatives and 
his capacity to exploit international crises that ultimately provided the impetus for 
unblocking the political logjam. As crises mounted in the Third World, particularly 
the Middle East, Brzezinski was increasingly capable of interpreting the situation 
and framing the adequate policy recommendations in the interagency debate.
Like Carter, many newly elected political officials seek to implement an agenda of 
reform and change. In particular, different regions can attract policy-makers’ atten-
tion and recolor their mental maps. For instance, the Obama Administration 
announced a strategic turn towards the Asia-Pacific region (Ross, 2012). In resem-
blance to the Carter Administration in the Middle East, the Obama Administration 
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has sought to strengthen US military presence and power projection in the Pacific 
region. In particular, the Administration has augmented its naval capabilities by 
increasing deployments to Australia and Singapore and reinforcing military coop-
eration with other regional actors such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Viet-
nam, and New Zealand (Manyin, 2012; Ross, 2012). This policy reflects a clear com-
mitment to a maritime strategy for facing the growing challenges in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Moreover, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance signaled the intention to 
shift the Department of Defense’s priorities toward the Pacific region (Dale, 2014).
However, as the current study attests, there are discrepancies between policy deci-
sion-making and policy implementation. While officials may decide on a particular 
policy, its development and implementation may encounter several barriers. Just as 
the RDF encountered bureaucratic and political obstacles, the American strategic 
shift toward the Pacific region may also come across many similar barriers. Bureau-
cratic organizations will certainly struggle to secure scarce resources and assume 
greater influence in determining military strategy. What is more, governmental polit-
ical battles will continue to frame the strategic international context and define the 
most appropriate policies. While some officials will view China as the greatest peril 
in the near future, others will champion other threats such as international terrorism 
or the rise of illiberal democracies such as Russia. These political challenges undoubt-
edly contributed to the lack of any clear reference to the new Pacific strategy in Pres-
ident Obama’s recent major foreign policy speech at West Point (Landler, 2014).
An understanding of the bureaucratic and political dynamics involved in the pol-
icy-making process will help decision-makers manage change and overcome some 
of the existing barriers. Specifically, by understanding the dynamics in governmen-
tal organizations and decision-making groups, particularly those involved in fram-
ing and defining the political context, decision-makers can also try to steer the 
decision-making process to avoid undesirable outcomes.
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